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Sole agency vs. multi-agency: an investigation of agency practice across England 
and Wales 
Abstract 
Purposes: This paper investigates the impact of different agency practice on agency fees, 
business efficiency and housing market liquidity.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper studies the effect of sole and multiple 
agency practices on estate agent efficiency, housing market liquidity and commission fee 
levels. The analysis uses the survey data from 2000 to 2006 to investigate the different 
agency practices across England and Wales and their effect on estate agency business 
efficiency, housing market liquidity, selling price and fee levels.  
Findings - The empirical analysis confirms that agency practice has a locality bias, that 
is, some regions are more likely to adopt sole agency practice than other regions. The 
estate agents with a sole agency practice charge a lower agency fee, help clients to 
achieve better selling price and are more efficient; whereas multiple agency practice 
facilitates liquidity in the housing market, but experiences higher fall-through rate. 
Research limitations/implication – The research focuses on estate agent rather than 
consumers due to the limitation of the data based on a research project concerning 
transaction costs designed prior to this analysis. 
 Originality/value – There is little other research that investigates the residential estate 
agency practice and its impact on housing market in the past three decades in England 
and Wales. The findings are a useful guide for practitioners to better understand the 
issues associated with different agency practices and should enhance business efficiency 
and performance. 
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Sole agency vs. multi-agency: an investigation of agency practice across England 
and Wales 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the UK, estate agency is primarily governed by The Estate Agents Act 1979 as 
amended by legislation such as the Consumer, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007.  
There is no legal requirement directing any particular method of sale, such as multiple or 
sole agency but there are legal duties imposed upon the agent. Some of these may have 
an impact on the sales process. These include the „Duty of Care‟ which requires the estate 
agent to „do their best‟ for their client.  If sale is by sole selling rights or sole agency, the 
agent must explain their meaning, or amended meaning, as set out in The Estate agency 
guide (OFT 2008). There is a legal duty to promptly give written details of all offers 
received from potential buyers (except where a client has given permission for them not 
to be passed on) and it is illegal to discriminate against potential buyers because they 
might not want to take services from the agent‟s firm or business connections. 
 
For no clearly defined reason, two different types of agency for property disposal have 
developed in Britain. „Sole agency‟ as a method of operating in the property market 
means that only one agent is appointed to act for the vendor. In referring to sole agency 
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areas one is referring to those parts of the country where this is the normal practice. 
„Multiple agency‟ or „mixed agency‟ has been used to describe the practice, mainly 
common in the south of the country, where vendors may instruct more than one agent, 
and often several, each to act independently of the other(s), with only the successful agent 
receiving the commission. Multiple agency areas could better be described as „mixed 
agency‟ areas, for some vendors within them do choose to instruct only one agent to act 
for them in a sole agency capacity, normally for an agreed period of time. The main 
sources of research addressing the various agency practices in Britain are to be found in 
the report conducted by the Monopolies Commission (1969) and subsequent survey by 
the Centre for Advanced Land Use Studies (CALUS) in 1975. It would appear that since 
then, there has been a paucity of published research in this field.  Consequently this is a 
subject that warrants greater study. 
 
In 1969, the Monopolies Commission published their report which found that estate 
agency practice varied in Britain and, although the pattern was not regular, north of a line 
drawn roughly from the Wash to the Bristol Channel, sole agency was the generally 
accepted method of operating (see Figure 1).  South of this line, multiple agency was the 
general rule, for although some vendors chose to appoint a firm of estate agents to act as 
their sole agents in the disposal of a property, many would instruct more than one and in 
some cases several. This practice was generally accepted by the agents – not only 
accepted as normal practice but accepted on the basis that only the agent who ultimately 
succeeded would receive commission. The report put forward one possible reason for 
such a distribution of different agency practice, that is: “ there is some ground for 
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thinking that in this respect the north and the south are at different points in a historical 
development of the practice of estate agency…, the north has not reached this point 
[multiple agency]” (cited in Stephens, 1981, pp.83). 
 
Figure 1 
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In 1975, the Centre for Advanced Land Use Studies carried out research and published its 
findings. They reported that the location of the firms that took part in the survey and the 
nature of agency practice had not changed significantly over the six years since the 1969 
Monopolies Commission report.  The regions that primarily undertook sole agency 
practice were Newcastle, Keighley, Liverpool, Sheffield, Lincoln, Stoke-on-Trent, 
Birmingham, Nottingham, Leicester, Norwich and their surrounding areas, reflecting 
regional difference in practice (Stephens, 1981, pp.84). 
 
In terms of income and net profit generated by the agents in the North and the South, the 
report compared the average commission per sale and the average profit in the two areas 
and found very little difference in net profit. In the incidence of abortive work, the agents 
in the South sold only one house out of every five for which they received instructions, 
whilst the Northern agents sold three out of every four.   There were various explanations 
as to how the two different forms of practice arose. It has been suggested that the 
explosion in home-ownership occurred earlier in the South and that it had been much 
more extensive. Northern communities were more self-contained and house-buyers less 
likely to move from one area to another and at less frequent intervals; the high level of 
movement in the South provided a much wider market for the agents to exploit. In 
addition, the general level of house-value in the North tended to be lower than those in 
the South and, significantly, commission rates also were historically lower. As a result, 
not only might the market place have been smaller but the rewards disproportionately 
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less. These factors may have acted as a deterrent to the acceptance, by agents, of multiple 
agency form of practice (Stephen, 1981). 
 
Since the CALUS (1975) report, there has been little research addressing this topic even 
though the housing market has been through several recessions and recoveries in the 
intervening period. It would seem reasonable to deduce that the changes which have 
occurred to the housing market during this thirty-year period would have influenced the 
use of sole and multiple agency practices, to a greater or lesser extent, since there is an 
intrinsic connection between the housing market and the estate agency industry.  
 
The research utilises the data collected from the Moving Cost Survey conducted by 
Woolwich Plc. in conjunction with the University of Greenwich.  This survey had been 
conducted every year since 1987 to 2006 and was designed to look at the trends of 
moving-cost changes in the residential property market across England and Wales. For 
each survey, the questionnaires were posted to a randomly selected sample of estate 
agents across the UK. Respondents from the previous year would participate in the next 
year‟s survey by receiving the questionnaire again and new samples would be added in 
the following year‟s survey. 
 
The responding agents were not asked directly whether they used sole agency practice or 
multiple agency practice since this was not the primary objective of the survey. However, 
they were asked to provide the fee levels charged for sole agency or/and  multiple 
agency, if applicable. Firms with multiple agency practice would provide two types of 
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information, in contrast with those operating sole agency practice only.  This 
differentiation was used as a basis for distinguishing the data in order to undertake this 
research. For consistency and convenience of analysis, the study period covers seven 
years, from 2000 to 2006 while the study range covers 10 different regions (i.e. East 
Anglia, East Midlands, Greater London, North, North West, South East, South West, 
Wales, West Midlands and York & Humber) across England and Wales, comprising 558 
towns and cities. Scotland was excluded from the analysis since Scottish agents use a 
different form of practice. 
 
In this paper, Section 2 reviews the literature, whilst Section 3 defines the data and 
research methodology. Section 4 discusses the results of test. The conclusions and 
research limitations are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review 
A review of the literature revealed that there are few studies on estate agency practice and 
its impact on the efficiency of estate agents and housing market in the UK. 
 
According to Stephens (1981), the advantages of sole agency practice are as follows: 
 It eliminates much abortive work, reduces costs and encourages agents to charge 
commission at a lower rate. 
 It creates a better and more professional relationship between vendor and agent, in 
that it imposes on that agent an obligation to use his best endeavours to carry out 
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his instructions and removes from him any temptation there may be to give 
anything other than the soundest possible advice. 
 In buoyant market conditions it minimises the tendency on the part of vendors to 
“gazump”. 
  
Disadvantages could be considered as follows: 
 The time taken by a sole agent to conclude a sale may be longer. In the multiple 
agency areas, the agent receiving instructions knows that it is the vendor‟s 
intention to instruct other agents, thus the agent would ensure that the property 
details or particulars will be sent to prospective purchasers as quickly as possible. 
The sole agent would be more able to put such work off. 
 Although the sole agents will recognise their duty to obtain the maximum possible 
price for their client, that client only has one agent‟s judgement of value on which 
to rely.  
 
However, multiple agency also has advantages.  The vendor instructing more than one 
agent will obtain greater exposure, because no one agent will be in contact with all 
prospective purchasers in his area. From a purchaser‟s viewpoint, a visit to any one agent 
is likely to give him, if not a comprehensive list of the properties available in that area, at 
least a fuller one than he would probably get if sole agency was the generally accepted 
practice in that region.  
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Against this, multiple agency practice generates abortive work and cost.  The agent may 
be reluctant to spend money on promoting a sale if he knows that his money might be 
wasted, should another agent find a buyer first and so get the commission (Stephens, 
1981). 
 
A different agency practice system is adopted in the U.S. A. where the agency 
relationship between agent and seller is formalized in the listing contract and there are 
several types of listing arrangements. Under an Open Listing (similar to multiple agency 
in the U.K), the seller can list the property with multiple agents and is liable to pay 
commission only to the agent that procures the sale. The seller does not pay any 
commission if he finds the buyer himself. Under Exclusive Agency listing, the contracting 
agent shall be the only (exclusive) agent that will be entitled to a commission and no 
other agent will have a direct contractual relationship with the seller. The seller alone 
may sell the property without incurring liability to pay the contracting broker. These two 
contracts are now rarely used in residential markets in the U.S under Multiple Listing 
Services (MLS) system (Miceli, 1988). The most common listing arrangement is 
Exclusive-Right-To-Sell contract which entitles the contractual agent to compensation 
regardless of who sells the property, including owner or other agents. Unlike the U.K, 
under the Multiple Listing Services (MLS) system adopted in the U.S, member firms 
submit their listings to the service, which then distributes the collected information to all 
other members.  Sales arranged by an agent other than the agent who originally acquired 
the listing result in a sharing of the commission according to a prearranged rule. The 
MLS is advocated to be advantageous in widening the house information exposure and 
easing the price competition among agents (Miceli, 1988).  
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There are several studies in the U.S context which investigate the impact of contract 
types on agent performance and the relation of time on market and selling price.  They 
highlight the complexity between list price and time on market (Rutherford, et al. 2001 
and 2004; Asabere, et al. 1996; Arnold, 1999; Yavas and Yang, 1995). These findings 
indicate that a lower listing price is not necessarily related to a shorter time on the market 
(Arnold, 1999), and higher list prices lead to longer marketing times (Yavas and Yang, 
1995). Rutherford, et al. (2001) developed and empirically tested a model that analyzed 
the effect the type of listing contract had on the performance of the agent. Their study 
found that exclusive agency listing contract resulted in faster sales and lower price than 
the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. Rutherford, et al. (2004) further extended their study 
and looked at difference between housing submarkets delineated by price. Their test 
results reveal a selling price discount associated with both broker-effected and owner-
effected for lower-priced houses compared with exclusive agency. They also offer 
evidence that shorter marketing times can be achieved without sacrifice of price, 
particularly for higher-priced house under exclusive agency listing arrangement. Miceli, 
(1991) examined the impact of split commissions on broker effort in MLS sales. He 
found that splitting the commission between the listing and finding brokers (when they 
differ) maximizes the joint profits of brokers. While sellers still prefer to pay only the 
broker who finds a buyer, brokers may not be willing to acquire and share listings under 
such an arrangement. 
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Regarding the role that an estate agent plays with respect to time on market and selling 
price, Anglin (1997) identified several variables as being important in explaining buyer 
behaviour, the estate agent associated with the provision of information being one of 
these variables. He argued that time on market is largely dependent on the performance 
of the selling agent, as well as overall market conditions. Judd, et al. (1996) investigated 
whether the seller‟s choice of real estate agent influences liquidity. Their study found no 
evidence that a particular agent or firm is able to sell a property faster than others, a 
finding, they argued, is consistent with efficient information flow and objectivity of the 
Multiple Listing Service. Yavas and Yang (1995) suggested that properties listed and 
sold by the same agency did not sell any more quickly than others with different 
brokerage arrangement. Baryla, et al. (2000) and Baryla and Zumpano (1995) indicated 
that the probability of a buyer finding a home increased over time with a broker-assisted 
search reducing time by increasing the number of properties viewed.  
 
When comparing agency service systems in the U.S and U.K, Miceli, (1988) attributed 
these differences to (1) the government role in the industry and (2) the level of owner-
occupier which is substantially higher in the U.S. In the U.S, the real estate agency 
industry is regulated by the government through licensing, whilst this is not the case in 
the U.K. These research findings, though biased towards the U.S market, may have 
certain underlying comparability within the sales process to enable them to have validity 
in the UK situation. 
 
3. Data definition and research methodology 
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Research methodology 
The data were selected from the Moving Cost Survey conducted by Woolwich Plc. in 
conjunction with the University of Greenwich. Due to a large number of estate agents 
participating in the survey over the study period, the data available for this analysis was 
sufficient and only the respondents providing full information were used for analysis, 
resulting in 4731 usable observations. The descriptive statistics test and mean comparison 
are undertaken to test the differences caused by different agency practices in terms of 
business performance, business efficiency, market liquidity and agency fees. Due to the 
nature of the survey questions, a Likert type scale technique was used to process the data 
and determine the respondent‟s level of agreement to a particular statement in order to 
undertake the analysis. This technique is used to capture subjective opinions numerically, 
allowing the researcher to collate quantitative data. 
 
Data definition  
 
Based on the research objectives defined, i.e. to investigate the impact of different agency 
practices on commission fee, business efficiency and housing market liquidity. The 
following questions on the survey questionnaire were determined as being appropriate for 
this research purpose. Table 1 summarizes the criteria of Likert scales of the study 
variables. 
 The firm size (Size). The size of estate agents is represented by the number of 
outlets in the organization to which a particular office belongs. To measure the 
14 
firm‟s size, respondents were asked to detail the number of outlets in their 
organization.  
 Business growth level (Business Level): the question asking agents to indicate 
percentage of change in business level in the past 12 months is used as 
representative of business performance; an increase in business level indicating 
growth and vice versa. It is argued that multiple agency practice would increase 
abortive work and reduce efficiency and business performance as well.  
 New instruction (New instruction): the percentage change in receiving new 
instructions over the past 12 months. This variable should be treated with 
caution. A positive change in new instructions for multi-agency does not 
necessarily mean a positive change in new business, since the vendor can instruct 
more than one agent to act in multiple agency practice and only the one affecting 
a sale will get the commission. However, for sole-agency, this would indicate a 
positive change, that is an increase in the number of new instructions.  
 How close the final selling price is to the asking price (How close). Agents were 
asked to indicate how much of the asking price can be achieved. Empirical 
studies in the U.S context suggest that types of agency contract can have an 
impact on the final selling price (Rutherford, et al., 2001 and 2004). Where a 
vendor puts a property on the market for sale through more than one agent, the 
negotiation power of a prospective purchaser may be increased; therefore, the 
final selling price achieved through multiple agency may be lower than the 
asking price. A sole agent is more likely to help the vendor to attain the asking 
price or even higher.  
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 Most active sector (Active sector): agents were asked to indicate the most active 
housing price bands in their regions to reflect the nature of their local housing 
markets. Multiple agency is more likely to be used by agents when dealing with 
higher value property or in regions where house prices are higher.  Consequently 
this question was used to examine the relation between property value and the 
choice of agency type as well as a proxy for the nature of the local housing 
market.  
 The time a property is put onto the market (Time on market) is used to determine 
the relative liquidity. If multiple agency is superior to sole agency in terms of 
speed, multiple agency will shorten the time required to complete a sale 
transaction; that is property will be longer on the market if sole agency is used 
than multiple agency. A larger variable mean indicates the property is exposed to 
the market for a longer time. 
 Purchase fallthrough (Purchase fallthrough): the percentage of purchase 
fallthrough is used to test the efficiency of different forms of practice. In the U.K. 
prior to the formal exchange of contracts, the vendor and/or purchaser can 
withdraw from the transaction process without paying penalty which results in 
purchase fallthrough. The high purchase fallthrough rate is generally regarded as 
low efficiency of the agency system or a particular agent.  
 
Table 1. The summary of study variables in Likert scales  
Variables Likert-scales 
Size Single 
practice=1 
2-4 outlets=2 5-9 outlets=3 10-20 outlets=4 
More than 20 
outlets=5 
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Business 
growth level 
Down>10%=1 Down 5-9%=2 Down 0-4%=3  Same=4 
Up 0-4%=5 Up 5-9%=6 Up>10%=7  
New 
instruction 
Down>10%=1 Down 5-9%=2 Down 0-4%=3  Same=4 
Up 0-4%=5 Up 5-9%=6 Up>10%=7  
Time on 
market 
<2weeks=1 2-4weeks=2 4-6weeks=3  6-8weeks=4 
>8weeks=5    
How close to 
asking price 
<85%=1 85-89%=2 90-94%=3 95-99%=4 
100%=5 101-104%=6 >105%=7  
Most active 
sector 
£80k-£99k=1 £100k-£124k=2 £125k-£149k=3 £150k-£199k=4 
£200k-£299k=5 £300k-£499k=6 >£499k=7  
Fall through  1-5%=1 6-10%=2 11-15%=3 16-20%=4 
21-25%=5 26-30%=6 30% or more=7   
 
4. Test results and analysis 
 
The respondent distribution is reported in Table 2. In total, 3310 (76%) respondents are 
reported to use multiple agency practice, while 1061 (24%) use sole agency practice. 
Multiple agency practice can be seen as being in a dominant position in the UK. Over the 
study period, about 30% of respondents replied once, 30% of them did twice and about 
40% did 3 times or more.  It is asserted that this provides reliable and consistent 
information.   
Table 2. The profile of respondents (2000-2006) 
Regions 
East 
Anglia 
East 
Midlands 
Greater 
London North 
North 
West 
South 
East 
South 
West Wales 
West 
Midlands 
York & 
Humber Total 
No. of 
respondents 266 271 304 173 260 1143 1195 234 275 250 4371 
Number of 
towns 26 34  30 39 189 98 49 50 43 558 
Response  
once 62 64 129 47 101 357 313 57 102 65 1297 
Response 
twice 73 96 98 61 76 397 273 66 105 82 1327 
Response 
 3 times or 
more 105 111 77 65 83 399 609 111 68 103 1731 
Mutiple-
agency  237 135 289 68 73 1028 1079 167 175 64 3310 
Sole 
Agency  29 136 15 105 187 120 116 67 100 186 1061 
% of sole 
agency 11% 50% 5% 61% 72% 11% 10% 29% 36% 74% 24% 
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Multiple agency practice is not the only form of practice in the South, since a certain 
number of estate agents, such as 5% of respondents in Greater London, 11% in South 
East and 10% in South West, 11% in East Anglia, 36% in West Midlands and 29% in 
Wales state that they do not take multiple agency, at least for property with relatively low 
value. Sole agency is more widely accepted in the regions such as East Midlands (50%), 
North (61%), North West (72%), and York & Humber (74%).  
 
Compared with the last survey in 1975 by the Centre for Advanced Land Use Studies, we 
found that there are now more regions which take multiple agency practice, such as 
Liverpool, Birmingham, Nottingham, Norwich and Cardiff where sole agency practice 
was the accepted practice in the 1970s.  These have switched to mixed or multiple agency 
practice now; however, Newcastle, Sheffield and Lincoln remain regions where sole 
agency is the generally accepted practice. 
 
The descriptive statistics results in Table 3 suggest that most of the responding firms fall 
into the category of 2, representing 2-4 outlets. However, the firms with multiple agency 
practice are generally larger than those using sole agency, indicating that small firms are 
more likely to practice sole agency. There is no evidence showing the significant 
differences in business growth level and the number of new instructions received between 
these two types of practice. However, there is evidence for significant differences in 
terms of how close the eventual selling price achieved compared with the original asking 
price, the most active property price sector and the time taken to sell a property. It seems 
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that sole agency is more likely to be used for lower value property and can help vendor to 
achieve the asking price. 
 Table 3. Descriptive statistics and mean comparison tests (England and Wales, 2000-
2006) 
 
Note: 1. *stands for significance at 10% level. 
   2. The data “Time on market and purchase fallthrough rate” are available for 2005 and 2006 only.  
 
Table 4 reports the ratios of both types of estate agency to the two indicators: „how close 
to selling price‟ and „time on market‟. The results in Table 3 show that the average time 
on market was about 6-8 weeks or more for both types of agency practice,  but soles 
agency does seem to take a longer time to sell a property. For example, 53% of sole 
agents report a sales period of longer than 8 weeks, compared with 44% of multiple 
agents;  32% of sole agents, compared to 35% of multiple agents take 6-8 weeks and 13% 
of them, compared to 18% of multiple agents need 4-6 weeks to sell a property (see Table 
4).  
Table 4. How close to selling price and time on market 
A. How close to selling price           
  More than 105% 100-104% 100% 95-99% 90-94% 
Less than 
90% 
Sole 
agency (%) 4% 4% 4% 54% 23% 12% 
Panel A. Size 
Business 
Level 
New 
instruction  
How 
close 
Active 
sector 
Time on 
market 
 Purchase 
fallthrough 
Sole agency (SA) 2.16 5.12 3.89 3.73 2.97 4.35 2.72 
Multi-agency 
(MA) 2.24 5.13 3.91 3.56 3.73 4.2 3.19 
Difference of 
SAAnd MA (0.09)* (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.17)* (-0.75)* (0.15)* (-0.47)* 
 
Panel B. Fees for selective property price bands 
 
       
SA£80k 
MA 
£80k 
SA 
£100k 
MA 
£100k 
SA 
£150k 
MA 
£150k SA£200k 
MA 
£200k SA£300k 
MA 
£300k 
 £1127  £1354  £1905  £2491  £3589  
 £1335 £1916 £1618 £2361 £2320 £3404 £3025 £4458 £4394 £6510 
Difference:  
SA and MA (-208.2)* (-264.3)* (-415.3)* (-533.3)* (-805)* 
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Multiple 
agency (%) 0.20% 0.80% 2.10% 61% 25% 11% 
 
B. Time on market        
 More than 8 weeks 6-8 weeks 4-6 weeks Less than 4 weeks 
Sole agency (%) 53% 32% 13% 3% 
Multiple agency (%) 44% 35% 18% 3% 
 
Regarding how close the final selling price achieved to the asking price, most of the 
agents fall into the category of 95-99%, but there are significant differences in other 
categories, indicating that the sole agency is more likely to achieve a higher selling price. 
For example, the results in Table 4 show that 8% of sole agents can help a vendor to 
achieve a selling price above the asking price, whilst only about 1% of multiple agents 
manage to achieve it. More multiple agents (97%) are reported to achieve a discounted 
selling price for the vendor than sole agents (88%).  Many factors could influence the 
selling price of a property. However, there are only limited studies investigating the 
relationship between time on market and selling price in the U.K. A few studies in the 
U.S context show that a  lower listing price is not necessarily related to a shorter time on 
the market (Arnold, 1999) and that  time on the market varies more with spatial location 
and market conditions than it does with property characteristics (Anglin, et al. 2003). 
Pryce and Gibb (2006) analysed the time to sale effects in Glasgow housing market  and 
argue that not only does the marketing time have an impact on selling price but that the 
timing of sale in relation to wider property cycle for that location is crucial. This may 
have had an influence on the data relating to the time of the actual responses but as this 
was not an objective of this research, we did not examine the issues here. Nevertheless, 
the findings here seem to suggest that the type of agency practice can influence market 
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liquidity and selling price to a certain extent, given that all other factors being the same. 
Anglin (1997) further argued that time on market was largely dependent on the 
performance of the selling agent, as well as overall market conditions. Our findings here 
support this argument.  
 
Regarding the most active property price sector over the study period, sole agency falls 
into the category of £125,000-£149,000 price band, whilst the multiple agency falls into 
the category of £150,000-£199,000 band, indicating the multiple agency practice is more 
likely to be applied in the transaction of higher value property. As for the purchase 
fallthrough rate, the sole agency falls into the category of 6-10%, significantly lower than 
multiple agency that falls into the category of 11-15%. 
 
These findings suggest that sole agency can help a vendor to obtain a higher selling price, 
but it takes longer to complete a sale.  Multiple agency is more likely to be used when 
dealing with higher value property, but has a higher fallthrough rate. This evidence would 
suggest that multiple agency results in more abortive work and may be wasteful in terms 
of time and cost.  
 
The fee levels charged by agents using multiple agency practice are significantly higher 
than those for sole agency across most of the property price bands. For the same price 
band, a vendor will have to pay a higher rate for multiple agencies than when instructing 
a sole agent. Thus, if the agent is one of those instructed by one vendor, he/she would 
charge as high as 45% more over the fee than if acting as a sole agent. 
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Higher commission fee levels charged by multiple agency may be one way that the 
agents compensate for the risk of abortive work  caused by multiple agency practice.  It 
might also discourage vendors from seeking more than one agent to act on their behalf. 
 
Sole agency fees are significantly lower than those for multiple agency. This might be 
explained by the fact that sole agency is less exposed to the risk of purchase fallthrough 
and its use by estate agents is encouraged.     
 
5. Conclusions 
 
From the analysis of the data, it can be concluded that sole agency practice can help 
vendor to achieve the asking price and its general adoption should lead to lower 
commission rate being charged.  
 
In sole agency areas an agent is only going to succeed if an adequate number of 
instructions are received. To draw new instructions the agent has not only to compete 
effectively in the image presented to the public, but also with the ultimate effectiveness 
of the services offered.  As a result the quality of that service must be the agent's main 
concern.  Agents in multiple agency areas are faced with different circumstances. The 
sole agent is more likely to compete successfully in terms of service which is mirrored by 
the endeavours made to help clients to achieve a higher selling price and maintain a lower 
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rate of purchase fallthrough. However, the study suggests that the multiple agency is 
more likely to compete in terms of speed. 
 
Where speed is the main criterion, the attraction for setting a number of agents in 
competition with each other is obvious.  Since agents are in business to make a profit, 
they will compete to be the first to affect a sale, but will this sale be on the best possible 
terms for the vendor? The findings here suggest this is not always the case.  
 
It has been argued that multiple agency could be detrimental to the interests of vendor 
and agent alike. However, there are many estate agents across England and Wales who 
use multiple agency practice and the number of regions adopting the multiple agency 
practice has increased over the last thirty years. One of the reasons could be that there are 
too many estate agents in England and Wales. It is estimated that there are around 21,000 
separately owned estate agency offices in England and Wales (Norwood, 2005), who are 
competing for available instructions, resulting in a greater level of competition in agency 
industry. Thus some agents have to adopt multiple agency practice to seek more 
instructions with the attempt to achieve more deals. Expansion of the housing stock is 
also mirrored by a rise in the number of estate agents‟ offices and vice versa  
 
The empirical findings here should be explained with some caution. Since 70% of the 
respondents responded more than twice over the study period, the findings may be biased 
to these frequent respondents. The focus of this study is on estate agents benefiting from 
the availability of a large set of data collected from the estate agents. However, the 
23 
consumers‟ view of and their satisfaction to different agency practice are not included in 
this investigation. This can be a future research topic. Nerveless it is asserted that this 
study provides some guidance to the practitioners and researchers about the agency 
practice and its impact on business  efficiency and effectiveness.   
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